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Abstract
In communication, information, and other industries, three-part tariffs are becoming increasingly
popular. A three-part tariff is defined by an access price, a usage allowance, and a marginal price
for any usage in excess of the allowance. The nonlinear-pricing literature has focused primarily
on two-part tariffs. We show that consumer behavior differs under three-part tariffs, in particular
regarding the impact of consumers’ usage uncertainty on tariff choice. We develop a
discrete/continuous model of tariff choice among three-part tariffs and estimate the model using
consumer-level data on Internet usage. By allowing consumers to switch from their current
provider to a competitor, we model behavior in competitive industries. Our results show that
demand uncertainty is a key driver of choice between three-part tariffs. For a given tariff and
average usage, the expected bill increases with the variation in consumer demand, steering
consumers towards tariffs with high usage allowances. Consequently, demand uncertainty
decreases consumer surplus and increases provider revenue. In addition, we analyze consumers’
responsiveness to the different elements of a three-part tariff. We find that the access price is the
main driver of consumer tariff choice, whose effects dominate any sensitivity to the usage price
or the allowance. Based on our results we derive implications for pricing with three-part tariffs.

Keywords: Nonlinear Pricing, Discrete/Continuous Choice Model, Internet Access, Three-Part Tariffs,
Uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, firms in a number of industries have introduced wide menus of
pricing plans that grant access to virtually identical products under different pricing
schemes. For services such as landline telephone and electricity, consumers generally
choose between two-part tariffs that differ in their access and usage prices. Three-part
tariffs are, however, becoming increasingly popular for communication services (wireless
phone service, Internet access), subscription services (online music download, online
newspapers), or car rental. A three-part tariff is defined by an access price, a usage
allowance, and a marginal price for any usage in excess of the allowance.
Despite the prevalence of three-part tariffs in practice, there has been little
research on the determinants of consumer choice and demand in such environments (for
exceptions see Iyengar 2005 and Reiss and White 2005). Most of the literature on
nonlinear pricing instead focuses on two-part tariffs (see among others Narayanan,
Chintagunta and Miravete 2005, Danaher 2002, Essegaier, Gupta and Zhang 2002,
Miravete 2002, Kling and van der Ploeg 1990, and Train, McFadden and Ben-Akiva
1987). A two-part tariff does not include a usage allowance and the consumer encounters
a constant marginal price independent of her usage. In contrast, the allowance of a threepart tariff implies that the consumer’s marginal price under a given tariff depends on her
usage: The marginal price is zero in case her usage remains within the allowance but is
positive in case her usage exceeds the allowance. We therefore expect consumer behavior
to be different under two-part and three-part tariff pricing.
When consumers sign up for a subscription-based service, such as cell phone
usage or Internet access, they do not know the exact amount, e.g. in minutes or megabyte,
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they are going to use in the following billing period. Instead they commit to a tariff based
on their expected usage and their typical month-to-month variation in usage. They then
realize their actual usage during the billing period. This temporal separation of decision
making and consumption has different implications for the consumer’s bill under twopart tariffs and under three-part tariffs. For a two-part tariff, the bill fluctuates with the
consumer’s usage. If deviations from expected usage are symmetrically distributed, the
consumer incurs on average the same charges under certain and uncertain demand. Under
three-part tariff pricing, however, the consumer purchases a usage allowance for the
access price and usage variation only affects charges if usage exceeds the allowance,
leaving the total bill unchanged otherwise. Usage variation is therefore more likely to
increase than to decrease a consumer’s bill on a chosen tariff. If the magnitude of this
asymmetric effect of demand uncertainty on charges is large, the consumer prefers a tariff
with a higher allowance than the one she would choose purely based on average usage.
An asymmetric distribution of monthly usage deviations can further amplify the effect of
demand uncertainty on tariff choice. Consequently, under three-part tariff pricing both
average usage and usage uncertainty affect tariff choice. For the provider, pricing
decisions based only on consumers’ expectations of their average usage ignoring their
expectations of variation in usage would likely be sub-optimal.
The usage allowance introduces an additional dimension into the provider’s
pricing problem. For example, in order to make a tariff more attractive, a provider can
change not only the access or the usage price, but also the allowance. This flexibility
improves the provider’s ability to match consumers’ heterogeneous tastes, thereby
helping reduce customer attrition and increase profit. Since models of two-part pricing by
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definition abstract from an allowance, their ability to shed light on consumer behavior
and its consequences on pricing under three-part tariffs is limited.
In this paper, we aim at empirically exploring consumer behavior under three-part
tariffs based on tariff choice and usage data of a German Internet service provider. We
have three objectives: (i) We determine how usage uncertainty impacts consumer choice
between three-part tariffs and its effects on consumer surplus and provider revenue. (ii)
We estimate elasticities of tariff choice and usage with respect to the access price, the
usage price and the allowance and thus explore consumers’ responsiveness to all
elements of a three-part tariff. (iii) We derive implications for pricing from the provider’s
perspective.
To appropriately account for consumer behavior under three-part tariffs, a model
needs to incorporate both the consumer’s discrete tariff choice given her uncertain usage
and the subsequent continuous usage decision. Building upon the literature on
discrete/continuous choice models (Hanemann 1984; Dubin and McFadden 1984;
Hausman, Tardiff and Belinfante 1993), we develop a model of the consumer’s decision
process under three-part tariff pricing. We relax three assumptions inherent in previous
work. First, we account for consumer uncertainty about usage at the time of tariff choice,
as in the two-part tariff model in Narayanan et al. 2005. Our model reflects the lag
between plan choice and usage occasions that is typical of communications services
pricing. Second, recent research has shown that consumers have tariff-specific
preferences, in particular preferences for flat-rate tariffs (Train et al. 1987; Nunes 2000;
Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). We therefore allow for tariff-specific preferences in tariff
choice. Third, we explicitly model a consumer’s decision to switch to another provider.
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In contrast to most research in subscription services that focuses on demand under
monopoly, this significantly increases our model’s applicability to competitive industries
such as Internet access, wireless phone service, or car rental. We estimate the model
based on an extensive set of usage data from a German Internet service provider for
10,715 consumers. We estimate tariff choice and usage elasticities and analyze the
impact of demand uncertainty on consumers’ tariff choice, expected bill, and consumer
surplus. From the provider’s perspective, we analyze the revenue impact of demand
uncertainty. Based on our results we derive implications for pricing and customer
management under three-part tariffs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first introduce our data.
Next, we develop and estimate a model of consumer tariff choice and usage under threepart tariff pricing. We then discuss the model results. We analyze how allowance, access
price and usage price impact tariff choice and assess the implications of demand
uncertainty from the consumer’s and the provider’s perspective. We conclude with a
discussion of the implications of the findings for pricing.

2 Data
Our analysis is based on confidential usage data from a German Internet service
provider for a sample of 11,717 customers with DSL Internet access and consumer
demographics (Table 1). For a subset of consumers we have a total of five monthly
usage observations. 7.6% of the customers self-identify as business customers. Since the
provider targets primarily residential consumers and does not offer specific business
tariffs, these customers are likely small businesses run out of the home whose Internet
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use covers both business and personal use. We include these households in our sample,
but control for differences in usage patterns.
Table 1: User Demographics
Characteristic
Customer

Value

Residential
Business
Male
Gender
Female
Missing value
below 20
Age
20-30
30-40
40-50
50-60
60-70
70-80
Missing value
High school
Education
Apprenticeship
Bachelor (Fachhochschule)
Master
Missing value
Not working
Occupation
Self-employed
White and blue collar
Public sector
Apprenticeship, military/ civil
service, school student
University student
Missing value
Number of people in 1
2
household
3
4
5
6
Missing value
Number of children 0
1
in household
2
3
4
Missing value
N=11,717
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Frequency
92.4%
7.6%
88.0%
11.0%
1.0%
2.0%
24.4%
38.7%
21.7%
9.3%
3.1%
0.4%
0.4%
4.6%
25.1%
14.5%
19.2%
36.6%
6.6%
13.3%
53.4%
7.0%
7.1%
12%
0.4%
34.6%
25.0%
16.8%
16.4%
4.8%
2.2%
0.0%
58.2%
13.6%
12.4%
3.6%
1.9%
10.5%

Average Std. dev.
usage of usage
2,025
838
1,854
939
2,056
866
1,718
720
1,303
506
2,967
1,267
3,232
1,310
1,691
748
1,618
642
1,289
586
687
350
702
307
3,314
1,946
2,667
1,190
2,284
908
1,524
686
1,378
624
2,269
944
1,988
742
1,897
832
1,854
769
1,389
638
3,200
2,515
1,646
2,269
1,685
2,154
1,810
1,959
2,178
2,383
2,007
2,060
1,821
1,703
1,809
2,339

1,320
1,106
719
990
679
940
701
834
868
1,172
846
920
686
705
715
1,015

For Internet access, consumers can choose between narrowband (dial-up) and
broadband Internet access. In Germany, DSL is virtually the only broadband Internet
access technology, with only 2% of broadband users using other technologies such as
cable. The four largest providers hold a combined 73% of the market as of September
2004 (Forrester Research 2005). Internet access is provided on a monthly basis. The
customers do not enter into long-term contracts with the provider, so a reassessment of
tariff or provider choice is possible in any given month.
In a given month, each customer in our data set can disconnect her service with
the provider or, alternatively, choose one of three tariffs offered by the provider. Tariff 1
has an access price and a monthly allowance. For usage exceeding the allowance, a
marginal usage price is charged per megabyte (MB) transmitted. Tariff 2 has a higher
access price and a higher allowance than tariff 1, but the same marginal usage price for
usage exceeding the allowance. Tariff 3 is a flat-rate tariff with unlimited usage. We
cannot tabulate the tariffs’ actual prices and allowances due to confidentiality
requirements; however, usage allowances fall between 0 MB and 5,000 MB during the
sample period and a typical monthly bill ranges between EURO 4 and EURO 30.
Table 2 illustrates consumers’ tariff switching behavior within the current
provider’s tariff menu. We also observe consumers leaving the current provider. The
overall attrition rate is similar to industry-wide rates of about 1.8% per month (Gupta,
Lehman and Stuart 2004). Similar to the provider under consideration, competitors offer
menus of tariffs that are defined in terms of usage in MB. We collect data on tariff
offerings of major competitors that are available during the consumer’s billing period and
classify competitors’ tariffs into tariffs with a low allowance, tariffs with a medium
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allowance, and flat-rate tariffs and report average prices and allowances in Table 3.
Observing actual competitive tariffs allows us to model a consumer’s decision to switch
providers in detail.
Table 2: Tariff-Switching Matrix
Switch to ...
Tariff 2 Flat Rate
85.7%
14.3%
67.5%
32.5%
0.0% 100.0%

Tariff 1
Tariff 1
Switch
Tariff 2
from ...
Flat Rate

Table 3: Summary of Tariffs across Providers

Low allowance
Medium allowance
Flat rate

Average fixed fee
(Euro)
8.90
20.40
28.30

Average allowance
(MB)
1,700
6,300
unlimited

Average usage price
(Euro/MB)
0.013
0.013
-

Total number of tariffs across providers: 10

We next present an overview of consumers’ tariff choices and usage patterns in
the data set to motivate the development of our discrete/continuous choice model. In our
set of usage data, the average customer transmits 2,012 MB per month (Table 4);
however usage varies significantly with a standard deviation of 6,008 MB. The standard
deviation in usage per consumer is on average 846 MB indicating that within-consumer
usage varies significantly across time as well. As Figure 1 illustrates many consumers use
less than the allowance. Among consumers on tariff 1 (tariff 2) usage is 50% or less of
the respective tariff’s allowance in transmission activity for 60.9% (52.8%) of usage
observations, whereas for only 5.1% (5.0%) of observations usage is 150% or more of the
allowance. 34.0% (42.2%) of users remain within plus or minus 50% of the allowance.
The usage distribution shows a small mass point where usage equals exactly the
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allowance. In addition, many consumers use less than their tariff’s allowance.

If

consumers indeed choose their tariff based on both usage uncertainty and average usage,
they are more likely to choose a tariff with a higher allowance and access price than if
deciding exclusively based on their average usage, even though their usage on average
falls short of the allowance.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics, Usage
in Megabyte
Average usage across
consumers
Usage across observations

Minimum

Average

Maximum

Standard
deviation

0
0

2,012
1,888

121,286
140,394

6,008
6,016

11,717
49,107

55,398

2,292

11,297*

2.236

0.329

11,297*

Standard deviation per
consumer
0
846
Coefficient of variation per
consumer
0.001
0.495
* Consumers with only one usage observation excluded

Number of
observations

Figure 1: Usage as Percentage of Allowance, Tariffs 1 and 2
10%

Frequency

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%
0%

20%

40%

60%

80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180% 200% 220% 240% 260% 280% 300%
>300%
Usage as percent of allowance in tariffs 1 and 2

Table 5 illustrates the extent to which consumers choose the least costly tariff
based on their ex-post usage. The rows list the chosen tariff, while the columns list the
bill-minimizing tariff for the consumer’s realized usage in her first available billing
period. The sum of the columns thus represents all consumers on a particular tariff. The
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diagonal thus represents consumers who have chosen a tariff that minimizes their bill in
that billing period. Consumers in the entries below the diagonal have chosen a tariff with
an access price and a monthly allowance above that of the ex-post bill-minimizing tariff,
a fact that the literature has coined a “flat-rate bias” (Train et al. 1987; Nunes 2000;
Winer 2005; Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). In contrast, consumers in cells above the
diagonal have chosen a tariff with an access price and an allowance that is below their
ex-post bill-minimizing tariff. Across chosen tariffs, between 6.9% and 63.5% of
consumers’ choices does not correspond to the bill-minimizing tariff. Further, a high
fraction of customers chooses a tariff with an access price above that of the ex-post billminimizing tariff. Only a small percentage of observations choose a tariff with an access
price below that of the ex-post bill-minimizing tariff.
Table 5: Tariff-choice Biases
Best Tariff
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Flat Rate
Tariff 1
93.1%
5.8%
1.1%
Chosen
Tariff
2
54.7%
36.5%
8.8%
Tariff
Flat Rate
23.7%
9.7%
66.6%
N=11,717

Since the consumer chooses a tariff at the beginning of the billing period before
using the service, the choice takes into account only the possible demand realizations. If
the disutility from incurring additional usage charges beyond the access price ex-post is
large, the consumer has an incentive to choose a tariff with an allowance that exceeds the
ex-post bill-minimizing tariff’s allowance. As Figure 2 shows, a symmetrically
distributed usage shock shifts both usage and total bill symmetrically under two-part
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tariff pricing. The expected bill is unaffected by the degree of a consumer’s usage
uncertainty. Similar to the two-part tariff environment, the usage shock shifts demand
symmetrically under three-part tariff pricing. However, the total bill does not fall with
usage once usage is below the allowance. A symmetrically distributed usage shock is
more likely to increase than to decrease a consumer’s bill. For two consumers with
identical average usage, the expected bill of the consumer with high demand variation is
higher than the expected bill of the consumer with low demand variation. These
differences in the expected bill impact a consumer’s choice between three-part tariffs and
in particular lead consumers with high usage variation to choose a tariff with a higher
access price and allowance than their counterparts with low usage uncertainty. One
explanation for the results of our descriptive analysis above, which is based on ex-post
usage, is that the choice of a tariff with a higher access price and allowance is optimal for
the consumer ex-ante, while deviations from ex-post optimal behavior reflect demand
uncertainty. The demand model in Section 3 recognizes the ex-ante decision process in
more detail.
Figure 2: Effect of Uncertainty under Two-Part and Three-Part Tariff Pricing
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The previous literature also proposes tariff-specific preferences and cognitive
mistakes as factors that steer consumers to a tariff with a higher access price and
allowance than is necessary ex-post. They are of importance if consumers prefer a tariff
that leads to fewer month-to-month fluctuations in their bill, simplifying budgeting and
financial planning or if consumers derive higher utility from not being charged an
additional usage price (Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). Other work has identified situations
where households systematically overestimate their usage (Nunes 2000; DellaVigna and
Malmendier 2005). In our empirical work, we incorporate tariff-specific preferences, but
do not investigate the source of such preferences further. We focus on demand
uncertainty in explaining consumers’ tariff choices.
To further investigate the role of demand uncertainty and motivate the model
presented in Section 3, we conduct a regression analysis of factors that drive tariff choice.
We focus on the subset of consumers who we observe for five months and analyze their
choices in the last month in which they appear in the data. We measure demand
uncertainty using the coefficient of variation of usage at the consumer level. We analyze
the consumer’s choice between the two three-part tariffs and the flat-rate tariff in a
multinomial logit model. Table 6 shows the results using tariff 2 as the comparison
group.
The first model analyzes the impact of average usage and coefficient of variation
only on tariff choice, while model 2 also incorporates demographics. The included
demographics are insignificant in explaining the choice among the three tariffs, with the
exception of business customers being more likely to choose a flat-rate tariff than either
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of the two three-part tariffs. The results confirm the likely impact of demand uncertainty
on tariff choice: a higher coefficient of variation increases the likelihood of choosing the
flat-rate tariff, relative to the intermediate tariff, whereas a lower coefficient of variation
increases the likelihood of choosing the tariff with the lowest allowance, tariff 1, over
tariff 2. The results on drivers of tariff choice are both statistically and economically
significant.
The marginal effect of an increase in average usage by 1 gigabyte, which is
approximately one standard deviation of consumer usage, on the choice of tariff 1 is 10.1
percentage points. An increase in usage for a given standard deviation in usage also
decreases the coefficient of variation, which counters the effect of the increase in usage
on the likelihood of choosing tariff 1. The net effect of a 1 gigabyte increase in usage on
the likelihood of choosing tariff 1 is a decrease by 9.6 to 9.7 percentage points. An
increase in the standard deviation of usage by 2 gigabytes, the typical variation in
standard deviations across consumers’ usages, decreases the likelihood of tariff 1 being
chosen by 2.9 to 3.7 percentage points through the increase in the coefficient of variation.
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Table 6: Impact of demand uncertainty on tariff choice
Coeff.
Tariff 1
+
Average usage
Coeff. variation
Business
Female
Age
Household size
Occupation
School student
University student
Educational Attainment
Apprenticeship
Bachelor's degree (Fachhochschule)
Master's degree
Constant
Flat-rate tariff
+
Average usage
Coeff. variation
Business
Female
Age
Household size
Occupation
School student
University student
Educational Attainment
Apprenticeship
Bachelor's degree (Fachhochschule)
Master's degree
Constant
Log Likelihood
N=
Tariff 2 is the comparison group

-0.974
-0.266

Model 1
Std. Err.
0.037 ***
0.152 *

3.882

0.115 ***

0.309
1.227

0.035 ***
0.367 ***

-4.343

0.332 ***
-1,816.005
6,342

Marg. Eff.
-0.101
-0.032

0.005
0.007

Coeff.
-0.988
-0.208
-0.516
-0.131
-0.005
-0.014

Model 2
Std. Err.

Marg. Eff.

0.039 ***
0.156
0.166 ***
0.167
0.005
0.037

-0.101
-0.025
-0.067
-0.012
-0.001
-0.001

0.048
0.134

0.196
0.166

0.001
0.013

0.012
-0.107
0.098
4.262

0.090
0.098
0.095
0.257

0.001
-0.009
0.009

0.337
1.276
0.786
-0.512
0.017
0.002

0.038 ***
0.382 ***
0.426 *
0.704
0.017
0.115

0.005
0.005
0.008
-0.001
0.000
0.000

0.839
-0.109

0.545
0.600

0.004
-0.001

0.113
-0.474
0.368
-5.097

0.274
0.345
0.293
0.804

0.000
-0.001
0.001

-1,740,623.000
6,215

+

*** p>0.01, **p>0.05, * p>0.1; Average usage measured in gigabyte (1 gigabyte = 1,024 megabyte)

The first results from the analysis of usage uncertainty and tariff-specific
preferences illustrate their potential importance in the choice of three-part tariffs and
point to possible differences in consumer behavior under two- and three-part tariffs. The
coefficient of variation in monthly usage is, however, only an imperfect measure of usage
uncertainty. It does not control for differences in pricing structures faced by the consumer
across months due to changes in the allowance for tariff switchers or changes in the
marginal price if usage exceeds the allowance only in some, but not all, months. The
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following section lays out a model of tariff choice and demand that explicitly accounts
for these differences in pricing structure while allowing for demand uncertainty and
tariff-specific preferences.

3 Model development and estimation
3.1 Model Set-up
Our model builds upon Hanemann 1984 who lays out a framework for analyzing
demand problems that are mixtures of discrete and continuous choices. His framework
applies both to discrete/continuous choice problems where the consumer’s discrete tariff
choice is contingent upon her continuous usage decision and to multiple discrete choice
problems where the consumer decides how many units of a discrete good to purchase
(Kim,

Allenby

and

Rossi

2002;

Dubé

2004;

Chan

2003;

Hendel

1999).

Discrete/continuous choice problems have been estimated primarily in the context of
demand for electricity (Dubin and McFadden 1984) and telecommunications. Hausman
et al. 1993, for example, employ a discrete/continuous model of demand to estimate
penetration of local phone service in the US. Due to a lack of data on usage, they estimate
only the discrete portion of the model, but incorporate the continuous choice consistent
with utility maximization. Similar to Narayanan et al. 2005 and Economides, Seim and
Viard 2004, the availability of detailed, consumer-level usage data allows us to fully
estimate the interplay between the discrete tariff and continuous usage decision, however
in the context of three-part tariff pricing.
Each month, a consumer makes two decisions regarding Internet access. First, she
chooses a tariff among the set offered by her provider or one of its competitors. The tariff
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choice is a discrete choice among the available tariffs and reflects expected usage for that
period. For the choice among alternative tariffs offered by the same provider, we assume
there are no switching costs between tariffs. This is reasonable as a consumer can switch
her tariff online.
Conditional on the tariff choice, the consumer then makes a continuous usage
decision about the quantity to consume. The model for consumer demand thus
incorporates the two separate decisions and the interdependence of tariff choice and
(expected) consumption.

3.1.1 Utility Function
The consumer has a choice between a set of J three-part tariffs. Each pricing plan
is defined by a monthly access price, denoted by Fj for tariff j, a usage allowance
measured in megabyte (MB) of data transmission included in the tariff at no additional
charge, q~ j , and a marginal price pj charged for each MB of usage that exceeds the tariff’s

monthly allowance. Within a provider’s portfolio, a higher access price is generally
associated with a higher allowance, so that Fj < Fk if q~ j < q~k . For the tariffs offered by
the provider under consideration, for example, consumers have a choice between two
three-part tariffs, denoted by tariffs 1 and 2 and one flat-rate tariff, with an unlimited
usage allowance or q~ = ∞ , so that F1 <F2<F3 and q~1 < q~2 < q~3 = ∞ . The pricing structure
offered by the provider uses a marginal price for usage exceeding the allowance that is
identical for tariffs 1 and 2. Such constant usage prices across tariffs are also commonly
used by the remaining providers in the industry and by wireless telecommunications
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providers, car rental companies, and other electronic content providers. Figure 3
illustrates the tariff structure used by the provider.
Figure 3: Tariff structure

Bill

F3

p
F2

p
F1

q~1

q~2

Quantity

We assume that consumer i making a choice of tariff j at time t maximizes the
following quadratic utility function:

U ijt (qijt , qOit ) =

(1)

qijt2 
ci 
dit2 ci
d
q
c
q
−
+
−
+ ς ijt ,
 it ijt
 i Oit
b 
2 
2b

with
qijt – usage of DSL Internet access,
qOit – consumption of outside good,

ς ijt – observable and unobservable consumer and plan-specific characteristics,
b

– demand slope,

ci

– marginal utility of income,

dit – demand intercept.
The consumer chooses consumption levels for qijt and qOit that maximize her
utility subject to the budget constraint
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(2)

yit = qOit + Fj + (qijt − q j ) p j

where the price of the outside good has been normalized to one. pj is equal to zero for

qijt ≤ q j and on a flat-rate tariff and strictly positive otherwise. This entails a demand for
usage qijt, conditional on choice of tariff j, of
(3)

qijt = d it − bp j .
The associated conditional indirect utility function is given by

(4)

1


 
V ijt ( yit , p j , F j ) = ci  yit − F j + p j q j −  d it − bp j  p j  + ς ijt .
2

 


If the customer's usage volume qijt is below the allowance q~ j , equations (3) and
(4) simplify significantly, but continue to imply bounded demand for usage.

3.1.2 Tariff Choice
A consumer's tariff choice is a function of tariff-specific preferences, ς ijt . We
decompose ς ijt into three observed preference shifters and an unobserved preference
K
shifter, ε ijt , that the consumer knows at the time of her tariff choice. We assume that ε it
K
is distributed according to probability distribution P(ε it ) .

(5)

FR
P
ς ijt = γ 0 I FR
j + γ 1 I j BUSi + γ 2 I + ε ijt

We include observable and unobservable preference shifters to account in a
reduced form for tariff- and provider-specific preferences identified in previous research
(Nunes 2000,

Lambrecht and Skiera 2006). We measure a consumer’s inherent

preference for a flat-rate tariff beyond usage considerations by including the observed
FR
is an indicator variable that is one if tariff j is a flat-rate tariff.
preference shifter I FR
j . Ij
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We allow for differential preference of the flat-rate tariff by business and residential
customers by including an interaction between the flat-rate tariff indicator and the
business customer indicator, I FR
j BUSi . In addition, we measure a preference for the
current provider that reflects perceived quality differences, inertia, or switching costs. We
include an indicator, I P , that is one if the plan is one of the competitors’ tariffs. A
positive coefficient γ 2 represents an inherent preference for one of the competitors
whereas a negative coefficient represents an inherent preference for the current provider
over competitors.
A consumer chooses her tariff based on her expected usage before making her
usage decision. We allow for consumer uncertainty over usage at the time of tariff
choice. We incorporate a usage shock, ν it , into the consumer’s demand to reflect random
variation in usage, which we assume to be normally distributed with mean zero and
standard deviation σν i . The consumer knows the demand shock initially only in
distribution. She observes her usage shock in the second stage before making her actual
usage decision. However, the usage shock is unobserved by the researcher throughout. To
ensure that the demand system is well specified, the usage shock ν it shifts the conditional
demand function as follows:
(6)

d it = exp( zit′ ai + ν it )
qijt = exp( zit′ ai + ν it ) − bp j .
where z it′ denotes a vector of consumer characteristics and time trends that affect

demand, such as household size, age, or gender. For given household characteristics, z it′ ,
and prices for a particular tariff, consumption on a three-part tariff depends nonlinearly
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on the realization of ν it . For values of ν it below ln( q j ) − zit′ ai , usage is on the flat part of
the tariff, below q~ j , where p j is by definition zero. For ν it > ln( q j + bp j ) − zit′ ai , usage
exceeds

q~ j .

For

a

usage

shock

in

the

intermediate

interval

[ln( q j ) − zit′ ai ,ln( q j + bp j ) − zit′ ai ] , usage exceeds the allowance of q~ j at a marginal price
of zero. At the then applicable positive marginal price, optimal usage qijt falls short of q~ j .
Therefore,

we

set

qijt

equal

to

q~ j

for

usage

shocks

in

the

interval

[ln( q j ) − zit′ ai ,ln( q j + bp j ) − zit′ ai ] . Figure 4 illustrates this mapping from ν it to qijt.
Similar to the model developed in Reiss and White 2005, our model predicts a mass point
in the distribution of usage. The usage mass at q~ j depends on the variance of the usage
shock. The fact that in practice, there is large variation in individual consumer usage over
time (Table 4) and the mass point of consumers using 100% of their allowance is small
(Figure 1) suggests that the variance in unexpected usage shocks is large.

Figure 4: Mapping from Usage Shock to Usage, Three-Part Tariff
qijt

q~ j

exp(zit′ ai )
ln(q~j ) − zit′ ai
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ln(q j + bp j ) − zit′ ai

ν it

We define xijt =

ln( q j + bp j ) − zit′ ai

σν i

consumption exceeds the allowance for

as the normalized ν it cutoff such that

ν it
> xijt . Substituting the expression for the
σν i

demand intercept into the indirect utility function then yields:

(7)

 ci  yit − F j  + ς ijt
ν it ≤ σν i xijt

 
.
V ijt ( yit , p j , F j ) =  
bp j  

 ci  yit − F j + p j q j −  exp( zit′ ai + ν it ) −
p j  + ς ijt ν it > σν i xijt
2  
 

The consumer chooses the tariff that yields the highest expected utility. Since

tariff-specific preferences, ς ijt , are observed by the consumer (but not fully by the
econometrician), the expectation is taken only with respect to the usage shock, ν it . The
expected utility from consuming on a three-part tariff is:
Ε[Vijt ] = Pr(qijt ≤ q j ) Ε[Vijt | qijt ≤ q j ] + Pr(qijt > q j )Ε[Vijt | qijt > q j ]
= Pr(qijt ≤ q j )ci ( yit − Fj ) + Pr(qijt > q j )

(8)

1


ˆ
′

ci  yit − Fj + p j q j + bp j 2 − zn
it ai Ε (ν it | qijt > q j ) p j  + ς ijt
2


= Ε[Vijt ] + ς ijt .

In equation (8) and the following exposition, a variable with a hat denotes the
exponential of the original variable, for example νˆit = exp(ν it ) . Equation (8) takes into
account that if the consumer’s ex-post usage falls short of q~ j , she only pays the access
price, F j , and no usage charges, whereas if her usage exceeds q~ j , she incurs charges of
pj for each additional MB of usage in addition to the access price. From equation (6) we
derive the expected value of νˆit given that qijt > q j :

20

Ε νˆit | qit > q j  = Ε νˆit exp( zit′ ai + ν it ) − bp j > q j 

(9)


q + bp j 

= Ε νˆit νˆit > j
 = Ε νˆit νˆit > σn
ν i x ijt
n

′
zit ai 

The conditional distribution of (νˆit | νˆit > σn
follows a left truncated
ν i x ijt )

lognormal distribution with an expected value of
2 Φ (σ ν i − xijt )
(10) Ε νˆit | νˆit > σn
x ijt  = e0.5σ
,
ν
i


Φ ( − xijt )

where Φ(·) denotes the standard normal distribution function. The probability that the
consumer remains within her monthly allowance is
(11) Pr( qijt ≤ q j ) = Pr ν it ≤ σν i xijt  = Φ ( xijt ) .
Therefore,
Ε[Vijt ] = Φ ( xijt )ci ( yit − F j ) + (1 − Φ ( xijt ) ) ci

(12)


Φ (σν i − xijt ) 
1
0.5σ 2
2
′
p j  + ς ijt .
 yit − F j + p j q j + bp j − e ν i zn
it ai
Φ ( − xijt )
2


Given that the marginal price, pj, of a flat-rate tariff is equal to zero, the expected

conditional indirect utility of a flat-rate tariff is simply
(13) Ε[Vijt ] = ci ( yit − F j ) + ς ijt .
The tariff choice is governed by the variance of the consumer’s usage shock

σν2i and the relative costs of the tariffs. For example, in choosing among two three-part
tariffs, a consumer prefers tariff 1 to tariff 2 if the expected conditional indirect utility of
tariff 1 exceeds the one of tariff 2 or Ε[Vi1t ] ≥ Ε[Vi 2t ] . This entails that the consumer
chooses tariff 1 if
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(14)

ς i1t − ς i 2 t
ci

− ( F1 − F2 ) ≥ p1 ( q2 (1 − Φ ( xi 2 t )) − q1 (1 − Φ ( xi1t )) ) + 0.5bp12 ( Φ ( xi1t ) − Φ ( xi 2 t ) )
2
 Φ (σν i − xi1t )

Φ (σν i − xi 2 t )
′
+ e0.5σν i p1 zn
(1 − Φ ( xi1t ) ) −
(1 − Φ ( xi 2t ) )  .
it ai 
Φ ( − xi 2 t )
 Φ ( − xi1t )


The consumer trades off certain benefits in the form of tariff-specific preference
gains and savings from choosing a lower access price (left-hand side) versus the
uncertain utility losses due to possible charges for usage in excess of the allowance
(right-hand side). The uncertain component depends on the variance of the usage shock
and the likelihood of remaining within the usage allowance. The higher the variance in
expected usage the more likely it is that the consumer prefers tariffs with a higher
allowance of data transmission. This is particularly apparent in comparing the expected
utilities of one of the two three-part tariffs to the one of the flat-rate tariff. A consumer
prefers tariffs 1 or 2 to the flat-rate tariff 3 provided
(15)

ς ijt − ς i 3t
ci



Φ(σν i − xijt ) 1
2
′ ai
− ( Fj − F3 ) ≥ p j  e0.5σν i zn
− bp j − q j  (1 − Φ ( xijt ) ) ,
it


Φ ( − xijt )
2



that is if the preference gain from tariffs 1 or 2 relative to the flat-rate tariff and
the certain savings from choosing a lower access price exceed the uncertain payouts in
case she exceeds her allowance on those tariffs. For tariff 1 or 2 to be the optimal choice,
households with high usage variation need to have a high preference for these plans.
Alternatively, the tariffs’ access prices need to be significantly below that of the flat-rate
tariff to offset the utility penalties associated with exceeding the tariffs’ associated
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allowances. Consistent with these tradeoffs, we show below that for the average
household in our data set, the probability of choosing a flat-rate tariff increases with σνi.
K
We assume that unobserved tariff-specific preferences ε it drive tariff choice, but
K
do not affect the distribution of demand. The two sets of unobservable characteristics, ε it

and ν it , are independent. Correlation between the unobservable characteristics arises, for
example, if the provider ran user- and plan-specific advertising campaigns and decided,
for example, to promote a flat-rate plan specifically to those consumers who exhibit large
variation in demand. We do not observe plan-specific advertising and know from the
provider that user-specific campaigns are not part of their marketing strategy.

3.1.3 Provider switching
In the data, we observe not only tariff and consumption choices by existing
consumers, but also consumers who decide to leave the provider. One option to model
the consumer’s decision to leave the provider is to assume that she disconnects her
service completely. Under this assumption, the value of leaving the provider is simply
normalized to zero, as in Iyengar 2005. This approach has the advantage of being easy to
implement in model estimation. However, it probably does not fully reflect consumers’
actual Internet access choices. Prior to subscribing to DSL Internet access, consumers
had to pay a fixed fee of EURO 100 - 200 for modem and installation. Given both this
upfront investment and the preference for higher transmission speed that consumers are
likely to develop, we expect consumers to switch to a different provider rather than to
disconnect or “downgrade” to traditional narrowband Internet access.
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Assuming that consumers who leave the provider switch to a competitor,
consumer attrition can be incorporated by allowing each consumer a choice among not
only the company’s three tariffs, but also those of the largest competing providers in the
market. Similar to Israel 2005, we assume that each month a consumer becomes aware of
the menu of tariffs offered by one competitor and takes this set of tariffs into account in
her tariff choice. This is for example the case if the consumer views an online or offline
ad of a competing provider. We randomly choose one of the competing providers’ tariff
offerings that are available at the beginning of the consumer’s billing period and include
the tariffs in the consumer’s choice set. The consumer then chooses not only between the
three tariffs of the current provider but compares the expected indirect utility of choosing
any of the competitor’s tariffs with the expected indirect utility of remaining with the
current provider. The advantage of this approach is that it limits the size of the choice set
and keeps the consumer’s problem more tractable than allowing her a choice among all
competing tariffs.

In summary, we specify the consumer’s initial tariff choice as a function of her
expected usage, her usage variation and her tariff-specific preference shifters. The
consumer chooses that tariff that maximizes her expected indirect utility in equations (12)
and (13) where the choice set consists of all tariffs offered by the current provider and
one randomly chosen competitor. The tariff choice incorporates the usage decision in
expectation. After the tariff choice, the consumer then makes a usage choice, where
demand follows the expression in equation (6).
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3.2 Model estimation
We use a logit specification for our discrete/continuous choice model. The
estimation of the model defined by equations (6), (12), and (13) proceeds via maximum
likelihood. We allow for attrition by randomly assigning another provider’s tariff offering
to each consumer’s choice set. For a consumer who chooses any tariff of the current
provider we estimate provider, tariff, and demand choices. The likelihood of seeing a
particular consumer’s choices is the joint probability of her provider choice, I itNC , her
plan choice conditional on remaining with the provider, I ijt | NC , as a function of expected
usage, and her usage, qijt, once usage uncertainty is resolved. For consumers who leave
the provider, we do not observe the choice of a particular tariff and consequently estimate
only the likelihood of attrition, which equals the probability that the consumer chooses
any one of the competing providers’ tariffs, or the sum of the choice probabilities for
each competitive tariff in the consumer’s choice set. Consumer i’s contribution to the
likelihood, lit, therefore equals:
(16)
 h( I itNC ; ai , b, ci , σν i ) f ( I ijt NC ; ai , b, ci , σν i ) g (qijt ; ai , b, ci , σν i ) if i chooses current provider

lit = 
1 − h( I itNC ; ai , b, ci , σν i )
if i leaves current provider
where h( I itNC ; ai , b, ci , σν i ) denotes the likelihood that consumer i stays with the
current provider in month t. f ( I ijt| NC ; ai , b, ci , σν i ) is the likelihood of observing consumer
i’s choice to be tariff j in month t, and g (qijt ; ai , b, ci , σν i ) denotes the likelihood of
observing the normally distributed demand shock ν it in equation (6). For any candidate
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values of the vector of parameters, ( ai , b, ci , σν i ) , the probability that consumer i chooses
tariff j in month t is given by the integral of the distribution function of plan preferences:
(17)

Pr( I ijt = 1) =

K

∫ dP(ε

it

),

Aijt

K
K
where Aijt = {ε it E[Vijt ] ≥ E[Vikt ] ∀k ≠ j} is the set of εit such that tariff j provides
maximal expected indirect utility, as defined in equations (12) and (13). Assuming that
K
the tariff-specific preferences ε it come from a type-1 extreme value distribution yields
closed-form multinomial logit tariff choice probabilities. We allow the marginal utility of
income, ci, to vary by consumer by assuming that deviations from the average parameter
values are distributed according to a mean-zero, independent Normal distribution with a
variance of σ c2 .
The advantage of the multinomial logit specification is that consumers’ choice
between varying options can easily be estimated. Since the logit specification restricts
substitution patterns between choices, we estimate a multinomial probit model to test the
robustness of the results. The probit model involves more complicated simulation
techniques to derive choice probabilities. If we allowed for switching to a competing
provider, the size of the choice set would be large and vary depending on which
provider’s tariffs make up each consumer’s outside option. To incorporate this setup into
a multinomial probit model with correlated normal choice errors, restrictions need to be
imposed on the covariance structure of preferences for the competitor’s tariffs. Given the
great disparity in prices and allowances of competing providers’ tariffs this does not seem
appropriate. We therefore estimate the consumer’s choice between the tariffs of the
current provider and the option to disconnect completely, a total of four options.
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K
We assume that ε it is distributed according to a multinomial Normal distribution
with a 4 × 4 variance-covariance matrix Σε . We use simulation techniques to derive the
multinomial probit choice probabilities, employing the GHK simulator with 200 draws
per household (Geweke, Hajivassiliou and Ruud 1994).
Observing systematic variation in consumer characteristics and prices that
translate into variation in choice and usage behavior identifies the model’s parameters.
Given the tariff structure used by the provider, we only observe two levels for the
marginal price, a price of zero on the flat-rate tariff and for usage on tariffs 1 and 2 that is
below the allowance q~ j , and a positive price for tariffs 1 and 2. The usage choices of
observationally equivalent consumers under these two price levels identify the price
coefficient.

4 Implications for pricing Internet access
4.1 Model results
Our model results include parameter estimates both for the logit and for the probit
estimation. We use one observation for each household in the sample selecting each
household’s third billing period. This results in a total of 10,715 observations. Table 7
summarizes the results. Overall the two specifications yield similar parameter estimates.
The parameters for tariff choice confirm that consumers have a systematic
preference for the flat-rate tariff relative to tariffs 1 and 2 as indicated by the significant
parameter estimate of the flat-rate dummy. This preference is significantly stronger for
business customers than for residential customers. In addition, the parameter estimates
that capture provider preference (-9.422 and -9.948) indicate a strong preference for

27

remaining with the current provider, consistent with the presence of state dependence or
switching costs in the provider choice.
Based on their tariff choice consumers choose their usage. Of most interest in the
analysis of the usage decision are the demand slope and the standard deviation of the
usage shock, σνi. We find similar estimates in the logit and in the probit specification
with values of the price coefficient b of 1.664 and 1.849, respectively. In a previous logit
specification we also modeled b as a random coefficient, but found its standard deviation
to be insignificant in estimation. These results indicate that usage falls in the usage price
and that consumers do not strongly differ with regard to their usage price sensitivity.
We specify the standard deviation of the usage shock, σνi, as a function of
household characteristics. In the probit specification, this is a linear function of
household size, whereas in the logit specification we allow for σνi to vary by further
demographics, such as age, occupation and whether a customer uses the Internet for
business purposes. We find the standard deviation of the usage shock, and thus demand
uncertainty, to vary significantly across households. The standard deviation of the usage
shock amounts to 141.6 MB for the logit model and 126.7 MB for the probit model for
the average household. It ranges from 8.6 to 99% of predicted usage, with a mean of 18%
and a standard deviation of 4.6%.
The standard deviation falls in household size, suggesting that high and low usage
levels of different members of the household average out, and increases with age of the
account holder. Hence, consumers are heterogeneous in the amount of usage uncertainty
they experience. The results confirm our reasoning from Section 2 that unexpected usage
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shocks largely drive observed consumer demand. In the next section we explore in
greater detail how demand uncertainty impacts tariff choice.
Turning to demographics we find that Internet usage significantly decreases with
age and increases with household size. Usage is not statistically significantly different for
the remaining demographic categories as well as for month-specific dummies.

29

Table 7: Parameter Estimates
Logit estimation
Estimate
Std. Err.
Parameters for tariff choice
Flat rate dummy
Interact. flat rate tariff - business
Provider Preference
Marginal utility of income, c
σc
(1)
Variance-Covariance matrix Σ=LL ’

2.714
2.607
-9.422
1.256

2.962
1.887
-9.948
0.406

1.346
0.950
1.085
0.040

l 32

1.011

0.698

l 33

1.105

0.415 ***

l 42

0.508

1.160

l 43

1.523

0.717 **

0.943

0.771

0.479

0.738
0.751
1.066
0.365

Probit estimation
Estimate
Std. Err.
***
***
***
***

0.143 ***

l 44
Parameters for usage decision (2)
Demand Intercept
Constant
Age
Household size
Occupation
School student
University student
(3)
Educational Attainment
Apprenticeship
Bachelor's degree (Fachhochschule)
Master's degree
Female
Business
Non-work days per month
March
April
May
Demand Slope
b
Std. Deviation of Demand, σ ν
Constant
Household size
Age
Occupation: University student
Occupation: School student
Business
Log-likelihood

**
**
***
***

2.629
-0.016
0.053

0.380 ***
0.004 ***
0.016 ***

2.533
-0.004
0.004

0.499 ***
0.002 *
0.026

-0.096
-0.129

0.206
0.272

-0.032
0.023

0.060
0.047

0.035
-0.127
-0.030
0.018
-0.218
-0.001
0.002
-0.026
-0.029

0.165
0.151
0.180
0.145
0.259
0.021
0.151
0.138
0.143

0.012
-0.029
-0.034
-0.054
-0.261
-0.045
0.063
0.114
0.126

0.232
0.235
0.230
0.045
0.108 **
0.025 *
0.191
0.176
0.191

1.846

0.499 ***

1.272
-0.002

0.047 ***
0.014

1.664

0.855 *

1.271
0.137 ***
-0.025
0.010 **
0.005
0.003 *
0.067
0.128
0.077
0.192
0.060
0.137
-46,479.280

-44,804.124

N=10,715 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1)

We estimate five elements l 32, l 33, l 42, l 43, l 44 of the Choleski decomposition L of the variance-covariance matrix to capture
the correlation structure of the multinomial normal errors. The remaining elements of L are normalized to L (.,1) = L (1,.) =
L (2,3) = L (2,4) = L (3,4) =0 and L (2,2) =1.
(2)

Monthly usage is measured in hundreds of megabytes.

(3)

We control for missing values by including an indicator variable for households with missing information.

30

4.2 Responsiveness of consumer behavior to tariff changes
4.2.1 Results
Based on our parameter estimates, we estimate price elasticities for tariff choice
and usage. Table 8 summarizes tariff choice and usage elasticities for the logit model. We
find that the choice elasticity of tariff 1 with respect to the access price is –0.510.
Demand for tariff 1 is much more inelastic than that of tariffs 2 and 3, with elasticities of
–10.788 and –4.453, respectively. Given the estimated high preference for the chosen
provider, the menu of plans offered by the provider is more attractive than switching to a
competitor. Among those tariffs, consumers on tariff 1 can only switch to a tariff with a
higher access price and allowance in response to a price increase. Thus, among tariff 1
users only those consumers with relatively high usage find such a switch attractive. We
have shown above that this group of users is small as many tariff 1 customers use far less
than the allowance. In contrast, when the access price of tariff 2 increases, consumers
have the option to downgrade to tariff 1 or upgrade to tariff 3 to remain at comparable
utility levels. Thus, the elasticity of tariff 2 is relatively high. Similar to consumers on
tariff 2, consumers on the flat-rate tariff can downgrade their tariff to tariff 2 in response
to an increase in access price, but cannot increase their utility by upgrading to a tariff
with a higher allowance. This explains why the elasticity of the flat-rate tariff is below
the elasticity of the three-part tariff. Whereas the elasticity with respect to the access
price of the three-part tariff with the lowest access price is thus relatively low, the
elasticity of the remaining tariffs is far higher and exceeds the elasticity of two-part
tariffs. Previous work has found tariff choice elasticities under two-part tariffs for local
telephone service from −0.46 to −2.19 (Train et al. 1987; Danaher 2002). The relatively
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high price elasticities also suggest that the provider does not choose profit-maximizing
prices.
The tariff choice elasticity with respect to the usage price is –1.225 for tariff 1,
and thus in absolute value higher than elasticities estimated by Train et al. 1987 in the
range of –0.20 to –0.41, but similar to more recent results by Narayanan et al. 2005 of
-1.0 to –1.8. A 1% usage price increase lowers the probability of choosing tariff 1 by
1.2%. Demand for tariff 2 is more elastic. A 1% increase in usage price decreases the
tariff choice probability by 6.4%. Again, in contrast to consumers on tariff 1, consumers
on tariff 2 can both upgrade and downgrade their chosen tariff explaining differences in
elasticities between both tariffs. Changes in the access price, however, have much larger
effects on the choice of tariff 2 than changes in the usage price.
We also find that usage is relatively inelastic to changes in the usage price, with
average usage price elasticity across households of –0.068. This is below results of
previous research on two-part tariff pricing that has found elasticities in the context of
local telephone service ranging between –0.10 and –0.75 (Park, Wetzel and Mitchell
1983; Train et al. 1987; Hobson and Spady 1988; Kridel 1988; Kling and van der Ploeg
1990; and Kridel, Rappoport and Taylor 2002) or as large as –1.70 to −2.50 (Narayanan

et al. 2005).
In contrast to the analysis of two-part tariff pricing we can also provide results on
the tariff choice elasticity with respect to changes in the allowance. We find elasticities of
0.461 for choice of tariff 1 and 5.453 for choice of tariff 2, indicating that in response to
an increase in each tariff’s allowance, consumers switch to the tariff, primarily from the
neighboring tariff. Tariff 2’s share increases proportionately more than tariff 1’s since an
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increase in its allowance makes tariff 2 more attractive to consumers on both tariff 1 and
the flat-rate tariff. In fact, increasing the allowance of tariff 1 and tariff 2 by 100 MB
increases the respective tariff’s overall share of consumers by 2.3% for tariff 1 and 10.9%
for tariff 2.
In addition, we analyze the elasticity of usage with respect to changes in the
allowance. We find elasticities of 0.295 for tariff 1 and 0.390 for tariff 2. This result is
interesting from two perspectives. First, the effect of changes in the allowance on usage
is larger than the effect of changes in usage price on usage (-0.068). This confirms that
the allowance plays a relevant role in consumer behavior under three-part tariffs. Second,
we find that changes in the allowance affect tariff choice more than usage which is in line
with our previous results that the elements of a three-part tariff are particularly relevant in
tariff choice but less in determining the actual usage volume.

Table 8: Summary of Price Elasticities
Elasticity of
Tariff choice
Tariff choice
Tariff choice
Usage
Usage

with respect to
Access price
Usage price
Allowance
Usage price
Allowance

Tariff 1
-0.510
-1.225
0.461

Tariff
Tariff 2
-10.788
-6.351
5.453

0.295

0.390

Flat rate
-4.453

Overall

-0.068

N=10,715

To further illustrate the effect of changes in the three components of a three-part
tariff on consumer behavior we consider the effect of varying different components of the
three-part tariffs on various consumer types. We vary the components such that the
consumer bill changes by the same amount. First, consider a consumer whose usage is at
1,000 MB above the allowance on tariff 2. For this type of consumer, a 1% increase in
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tariff 2’s access price and a 1% increase in the usage price have the same effect on her
bill on tariff 2. However, the increase of the access price decreases the predicted
probability of choosing tariff 2 by 10.8% whereas the increase in usage price decreases
the predicted probability of choosing tariff 2 only by 6.3%. Next, consider a low-usage
consumer whose usage exceeds the allowance on tariff 1 by 1,000 MB. Decreasing tariff
1’s access price by 3.5% and increasing its allowance by 1% entail identical effects on
her bill on tariff 1. Lowering the access price, however, increases the probability of
choosing tariff 1 by 1.8% whereas increasing the allowance increases the probability of
choosing tariff 1 only by 0.5%. Results of both counterfactuals thus illustrate that under
three-part tariff pricing consumers are particularly responsive to changes in the access
price compared to changes in the allowance and in the usage price.
Our analysis of tariff choice and usage elasticities with respect to the three price
components of a three-part tariff provides additional support that consumer behavior
differs significantly under two- and three-part tariffs. Whereas a consumer’s tariff choice
and usage decision under a two-part tariff is driven by access and usage price, we find
that these decisions in the context of three-part tariffs are primarily driven by access price
comparisons and less so by allowance and usage price. One reason for this result is that
under a three-part tariff, the average user assesses the probability of exceeding the
allowance to be small and consequently chooses a tariff primarily based on the access
price and the allowance but less so based on the usage price.

4.2.2 Implications
Our results on tariff choice and usage elasticities under three-part tariff pricing
have two implications for the provider’s pricing. First, the usage price does not
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significantly change either the initial tariff choice or the ex-post usage. A comparison of
our results with results from previous studies on two-part tariff pricing suggests that the
usage price is less important in determining demand under three-part pricing than under
two-part pricing. Consequently, for the given pricing structure the results suggest that the
provider’s revenue potential lies primarily in changes of the allowance and the usage
price. Second, when considering a decrease (increase) in the access price versus an
increase (decrease) in the allowance, the provider needs to take into account the
cumulative effect of such changes on consumer behavior across tariff offerings. For the
tariff structure chosen by the provider, the effect of access price changes dominates any
adjustment in behavior from changes in the usage allowance. Neither changes in the
allowance nor changes in the usage price affect tariff choice very much.

4.3 Implications of uncertainty for consumer behavior and
surplus and provider revenue
Our model estimation has shown that consumer demand uncertain is large,
ranging from 8.6 to 99% of predicted usage, with a mean of 18%. In this section, we
analyze the impact of demand uncertainty on consumer choice between three-part tariffs
and the effect of changes in demand uncertainty on consumer welfare and provider
revenue.

4.3.1 Results
To assess the role of unexpected demand fluctuations in the consumer’s tariff
choice, we first numerically simulate tariff choice elasticities with respect to changes in
the standard deviation of the usage shock, σνi. We find that a 1% increase in σνi decreases
the probability of choosing tariff 1 by 1.404%, at the expense of a higher share of
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consumers who switch to tariffs 2 and 3, with elasticities of 2.940 and 1.813,
respectively. These elasticities represent the net effect of both consumers switching from
tariff 1 to tariff 2 and to the flat rate and consumers switching from tariff 2 to the flat rate
in response to the higher demand variation. Our numerical results are thus in line with the
expectation that a higher usage shock variance, σνi, leads to a higher likelihood of
choosing a tariff with a higher allowance.
The usage shock that enters the indirect utility, ν it = exp(ν it ) , is log-normally
distributed. As a result, an increase in the standard deviation of the underlying error, ν it ,
increases the standard deviation as well as the expected value of ν it , both of which affect
the tariff-choice elasticities with respect to σν i . The above results thus account for both
effects. To focus exclusively on the role of usage uncertainty, we also compute tariff
choice elasticities with respect to changes in the standard deviation of usage, holding
expected usage on a given tariff constant. We rewrite the demand function as

(18)

qijt = (1 + α ) exp( zit′ ai ) exp(ν it ) − bp j  − α E(qijt ), with
E(qijt ) = exp( zit′ ai ) exp(0.5σ 2 ) − (1 − Φ ( xijt ) ) bp j .
In this expression, α measures the percent change in the standard deviation of

usage. For a value of α = 0 , the equation reduces to the original demand function in
equation (6). By including the term −α E(qijt ) , we hold expected usage constant for
increases or decreases in the standard deviation of usage. The results in Table 9 confirm
that even with a constant expected usage, consumers are more likely to choose a tariff
with a higher allowance as usage uncertainty increases. We find an elasticity of –0.304
for tariff 1, again balanced by positive elasticities of 0.391 and 0.425 for tariffs 2 and 3,
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respectively. This illustrates that with increasing uncertainty, consumers are more likely
to switch to a tariff with a higher allowance and access price and ultimately to a flat rate
tariff, which is in line with our expectations of consumer behavior under usage
uncertainty. The comparison of these results to the tariff choice elasticities with respect to

σν i illustrates the role of increases in expected usage shifting consumers to tariffs with
higher allowances in the initial uncertainty elasticity. The elasticities that hold expected
usage constant are smaller in magnitude, but are driven by similar considerations to the
ones discussed above.

Table 9: Summary of Uncertainty Elasticities
Tariff 1

Tariff
Tariff 2

Elasticity of

with respect to

Flat rate

Tariff choice

Std dev of usage shock, σνi

-1.404

2.940

1.813

Tariff choice

Std dev of usage, σq

-0.304

0.391

0.425

N=10,715

An increase in σq also affects a consumer’s expected bill on the three-part tariffs 1
and 2. Figure 5 illustrates that averaged over all consumers, higher levels of σq, for
constant expected usage, are associated with higher expected bill amounts. For example,
an increase in the standard deviation of usage by 20% increases the expected bill on tariff
1 on average by 13%. This results from changes in expected usage conditional on
exceeding the allowance and changes in the probability of exceeding the allowance. For
usage below the allowance, the bill remains constant at the access price. The expected
bill of a consumer on a three-part tariff increases in σq because of the asymmetric effect
of usage variation on the billed amount.
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Figure 5: Effect of changes in σq on average expected bill on tariffs 1 and 2
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An increase in usage variation, σq, thus increases both the probability of choosing
a three-part tariff with a higher allowance and the expected bill on a given three-part
tariff. This in turn affects provider profit and consumer surplus. Changes in provider
profit stem from changes in revenue from consumers with widely fluctuating usage
patterns, as well as associated cost considerations. A provider that wants to satisfy
maximum demand at all times needs to provide higher network capacity if consumers
have highly varying usage. Since the necessary usage capacity depends on correlation
and inter- and intra-day fluctuations in individual consumers’ usage levels, assessing the
profit implications of usage variation is difficult. We focus instead on revenue
implications of increasing the standard deviation in usage.
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between changes in σq and provider revenue
and consumer surplus. We compute expected consumer surplus and expected provider
revenue by numerically integrating over the distribution of the unobserved usage and
choice shocks.
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We find significant changes in consumer surplus and revenue as consumers’
usage variation increases. For example, when usage variation increases by 20%,
consumer surplus decreases by 1.8% and revenue increases by 1.5%. Consumer surplus
reflects the changes in the expected bill and decreases steadily with increases in σq.
Provider revenue, on the other hand, increases in σq. Even though at first sight the
absolute numbers do not seem large, a windfall revenue gain of 1.5% that might translate
into a similar profit increase is very relevant from a provider’s perspective. The
magnitude of the changes reflects also the provider’s chosen tariff structure that awards a
high allowance to consumers on the smallest tariff, relative to their average usage. An
alternative tariff structure that uses the allowance more effectively as a means of price
discrimination would entail more significant effects on consumer surplus and revenue.

Figure 6: Effect of changes in σq on provider revenue and consumer surplus
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expected consumer surplus

100%

4.3.2 Implications
Our results on consumer demand uncertainty under three-part tariff pricing have
implications for both provider and consumer behavior. If consumers have uncertainty
over their usage, providers can derive revenues under three-part tariff pricing that they
cannot derive under two-part tariff pricing. If the revenue effect is not completely offset
by additional costs from providing a higher maximum usage capacity, providers of
services where the choice and usage decisions are separated prefer three-part tariff
pricing over two-part tariff pricing. In addition, providers have an incentive to target
consumers with characteristics that are correlated with high usage fluctuations in order to
increase revenue.
Our results show that under three-part tariff pricing usage uncertainty is costly to
consumers. A dynamic consideration might then be to smooth out usage over time.
Because consumers with high usage variation have a higher expected bill and lower
consumer surplus, three-part tariffs are less attractive than two-part tariffs.

5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a discrete/continuous model of consumer tariff and
usage choices under three-part tariffs. This extends the literature on non-linear pricing
that has so far largely focused on two-part tariff pricing. We estimate the model using
consumer-level data on Internet usage. In addition, we allow for consumers to leave the
current provider and switch to a competitor’s tariff. Thus, we make our model applicable
to competitive industries. Our results show that demand uncertainty is a key driver of
choice between three-part tariffs and steers consumers towards tariffs with high usage
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allowances. For a given tariff and average usage, the expected bill of a consumer
increases with her demand uncertainty and, thus, consumers with high demand
uncertainty are more likely to upgrade to a tariff with higher allowance. Consequently,
demand uncertainty decreases consumer surplus and, thus, is costly to the consumer. At
the same time, providers derive increased revenues from consumers’ demand uncertainty
that they would likely not earn under two-part tariff pricing.
We also analyze the responsiveness of consumers to the different elements of a
three-part tariff. Our findings reveal that for the chosen pricing structure, the access price
is the main driver of consumer tariff choice, whose effects dominate any sensitivity to the
usage price or the allowance, possibly because the likelihood of exceeding the allowance
of a three-part tariff is small. Consequently, a provider’s pricing should focus on the
access price. We also find that consumers have a preference for flat-rate tariffs.
Our results also allow a more general conclusion. Under two-part tariff pricing
providers traditionally discriminate prices based on expected usage. The allowance as an
additional element of pricing under three-part tariffs, however, allows providers to set
prices that discriminate not only over average usage, but also over variation in usage.
Providers can thereby account for consumer uncertainty over usage. One interesting
avenue for future research is to further examine price-setting in such two-dimensional
non-linear pricing problems and in particular determine optimal intervals between
different tariffs’ access price and allowance combinations.
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